Keywords: economics, learning
behavior, cognition, cognitive psychology, decision making, behavioral
anomalies, experiments, evolution, rationality, rational expectations,
risk behavior, bargaining, choice anomaly.
Tilman Slembeck
- Current Research
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Welcome!
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Abstracts of Papers in Progress - ©
by Tilman Slembeck and Coauthors
Overview
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"Monty Hall‘s Three Doors: Does the Choice Anomaly Survive Communication
and Competition?" - see abstract
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"Noisy Decision Makers - On Errors, Noise and Inconsistencies in Economic
Behaviour" - see abstract
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"Learning Preferences Over Risky Prospects - Experimental Evidence From
Three Countries" - see abstract
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"Reinforcement Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining - A Multi-Armed Bandit
Experiment" - see abstract
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"The Curse of Private Information - Experimental Evidence" - see
abstract
For abstracts of
completed papers click here
Monty Hall‘s Three Doors: Does the Choice Anomaly Survive Communication
and Competition?
(with Jean-Robert
Tyran, University of St.Gallen)
Abstract
In a recent paper in the American Economic Review, Daniel
Friedman (1998) studies a choice anomaly (the so-called Three-Door-Anomaly)
in individual decision making that appears to be robust with regard to
several learning environments.Although convergence toward rational behavior
is rather weak in his experiment, Friedman (p. 941) asserts that "every
choice 'anomaly' can be greatly diminished or entirely eliminated in appropriately
structured learning environments."
In a new experiment we find no evidence for this assertion in "institution-free"
environments even when the task is repeated many times. However, there
is strong evidence that social and economic institutions -such as communication
and competition- are able to eliminate the Three-Door-Anomaly entirely.
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Noisy Decision Makers On Errors, Noise and Inconsistencies in Economic
Behaviour
(with Thomas
Brenner, Max-Planck-Institute Jena)
Abstract
Although economists generally agree that real people at least sometimes
err and laboratory experiments provide much evidence for "erroneous" and
inconsistent behaviour, noisy decision-making is rarely studied in detail.
In most theories errors do not matter and in experiments they are often
regarded as a annoying factor that causes noisy data. Some attempts have
been made to model noisy behaviour in experiments but a general approach
that also addresses the sources of noise is missing. This paper outlines
a general taxonomy of human error by identifying three main types of noisy
behaviour: task dependent noise, learning noise and white noise. These
types are formalized in a general framework and their relevance is discussed
in the light of experimental experimental data.
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Learning Preferences Over Risky Prospects: Experimental Evidence From Three
Countries
(with Ken
Binmore, E.L.S.E., University College London)
Abstract
Several experimental studies on decision making under risk have presented
evidence that subjects do not maximise expected utility, but are risk averse.
Also, when the task is repeated, many choices are reversed so that preferences
appear to be unstable. These findings are interpreted as resulting from
"errors" (Hey and Orme, 1994). This paper asks whether preferences do settle
and "errors" are reduced when appropriate conditions for learning are provided.
Based on the Hey/Orme study, a new experiment explores the roles of three
factors: feedback, representation of the task, and differences in expected
values. Evidence suggests that preferences are much more stable when subjects
are allowed to learn, and that choices are more in accordance with expected
utility theory.
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Reinforcement Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining: A Multi-Armed Bandit Experiment
(with Thomas
Brenner, Max-Planck-Institute Jena)
Abstract
Reinforcement learning is prominent among the non-cognitive approaches
in the current literature on learning in economics. Some authors have argued
that this type of learning is the key to the dynamics of ultimatum bargaining.
Experimental evidence is mixed. This paper presents an experiment where
the Ultimatum Game is modelled as a multi-armed bandit problem in order
to take the non-cognitive nature of reinforcement learning literally, and
to provide a direct test of this theory. [Data show that play does not
converge to what is usually observed in experiments so that the reinforcement
learning hypothesis can be rejected to account for ultimatum play by itself.
Additional hypotheses are discussed.]
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The Curse of Private Information: Experimental Evidence
Abstract
In many situations private information is assumed to be advantageous
for the informed party. This paper presents evidence for the case where
private information is disadvantageous, i.e. subjects in a laboratory experiment
are willing to bear costs for not receiving private information, and can
sometimes coordinate on a Pareto-efficient equilibrium in order to overcome
the curse. It is argued that the "curse of private information" is the
common rationale of several well-known problems under asymmetric information,
such as principal agent problems, moral hazard problems, Akerlof's lemon
problem, and Buchanan's veil of ignorance, and that establishing Pareto-efficiency
can require costly signalling or coordination in order to overcome the
curse.
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Last update: 27 April 2000, page created by
T.S. Sept. 1995